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For when you're past the basics. Targeted-individual threat models, hardware sovereignty, supply-chain integrity, and the resources we link out to instead of trying to compete with.

Honest framing: if you're a journalist, dissident, defender, or otherwise threat-modeled by a capable adversary, the v1 Sovereign Switch site is not enough. These resources are. We point at them rather than rewriting them.

Builders & published work we follow

The people and projects whose published work shapes this site. Not exhaustive — this is the working set we reference, not a directory.

Phones & mobile hardware

Email, storage, communication

Infrastructure & hosting

Research, journalism, methodology

Tools we recommend along the path

Resources we trust

Hardware sovereignty

Modern x86 CPUs have a "management engine" (Intel ME) or "platform security processor" (AMD PSP) running beneath your operating system — a closed-source, signed firmware layer with its own network stack and full memory access. You can't audit it, you can't turn it off without consequences, and you can't fully trust it.

For most readers this is fine: your threat model doesn't include the kind of adversary who can exploit Intel ME against you specifically. For some readers it isn't fine. Paths from least to most invasive:

Strong anonymity

The v1 site doesn't address anonymity — we focus on confidentiality and jurisdiction. If anonymity is what you need:

Supply-chain integrity

Reproducible builds, Sigstore, SLSA, and the broader software supply-chain conversation. Beyond v1's scope but increasingly load-bearing for everyone. The most accessible entry point is reading reproducible-builds.org.

Targeted-individual threat models

If you're protecting yourself from a state-level adversary, an organized adversary, or a stalker with resources, you need professional help and you need it before you change anything technical. We're not equipped to give that help. Resources that are:

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